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Recent cohorts of college enrollees are more likely to work, and work substantially more, than those
of the past. October CPS data reveal that average labor supply among 18 to 22-year-old full-time undergraduates
nearly doubled between 1970 and 2000, rising from 6 hours to 11 hours per week. In 2000 over half
of these “traditional” college students were working for pay in the reference week, and the average
working student worked 22 hours per week. After 2000, labor supply leveled off and then fell abruptly
in the wake of the Great Recession to an average of 8 hours per week in 2009. This paper considers
several explanations for the long-term trend of rising employment—including compositional change
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Today’s college enrollees are more likely to work, and work more, than their counterparts 
in the past. The trend is most pronounced among “traditional” undergraduates: 18 to 22 year olds 
enrolled full-time at either two-year or four-year colleges. Overall labor supply among these 
students rose steadily between 1970 and 2000, nearly doubling from 6 hours to 11 hours per 
week. In 2000, more than half were working for pay during the October Current Population 
Survey (CPS) reference week, and the average working student worked about 22 hours per 
week—significantly more time than the typical student spends on schoolwork outside of class.2 
After 2000, labor supply leveled off and then fell sharply in 2009 to 8 hours per week—giving 
up nearly half of the long-term increase in a single year. The same pattern is repeated across age, 
race, gender, family income, and institutional subgroups. 
Given the unrelenting rise in tuition prices over the past 40 years, an immediate concern 
is that the increase in student employment may reflect a market failure rather than an 
economically efficient time allocation decision. Unless student employment has other benefits, 
students would be better off borrowing money to finance rising costs, so that they could finish 
college faster or with higher levels of achievement. But credit-constrained students may have 
little choice but to work. This in turn may delay or diminish their acquisition of human capital, 
thus decreasing the return on their educational investment.  
This concern is reinforced by empirical evidence that student employment interferes with 
academics. First, rising levels of term-time employment roughly correspond with an increase in 
the time students take to complete their degrees (Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner, 2010). In 2003, 
                                                 
2 The National Survey of Student Engagement (2004) reports an average of 14 hours per week studying for full-time 
seniors in college, and an average of 13 hours per week studying full-time first-year undergraduates (the same 
survey reports average weekly work hours of 14 and 8 for seniors and first-years, respectively). Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner (2003) also report an average of 2 hours per day of studying.  
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less than 40 percent of college graduates age 30 and younger had earned their degree by age 22, 
compared to about 60 percent in the 1970s and 1980s (Turner, 2005). Moreover, several studies 
using plausibly exogenous variation to estimate the consequences of student employment have 
found significant negative effects on academic performance. Tyler (2003) uses cross-state 
variation in the stringency of child labor laws to instrument for hours worked by twelfth graders, 
and concludes that working an additional 10 hours per week is associated with a 0.20 standard 
deviation decrease in math test scores. Similar effects may apply to college student employment. 
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003) examine students at Berea College, all of whom are 
required to work at least 10 hours per week, and who are randomly assigned to an on-campus 
job. Because some jobs allow students to work more than 10 hours per week, while others do 
not, the authors use initial job assignments to instrument for hours worked. They find that an 
additional hour worked per week decreases the first semester grade point average by 0.162 points 
out of a four-point scale. Finally, Scott-Clayton (2011) uses institutional variation in access to 
Federal Work-Study (FWS) funds to instrument for FWS participation, and finds that program 
participation is associated with significant declines in GPA and graduation rates for women, 
though it may have some positive effects for men.3  
Credit constraints are not the only possible explanation for rising student employment, 
however. Student work is hardly a new phenomenon: even in 1970 over a third of young, full-
time students were working, including more than one in five students at four-year institutions 
from the top quartile of family income.4 Unless all of these students were credit constrained, 
many students apparently believe there are benefits to working that outweigh any potential harm 
                                                 
3 DeSimone (2008) and Kalenkoski and Pabilonia (2010) instrument for student employment (using parental 
schooling and religion, and parental transfers and net schooling costs, respectively) and find negative effects on 
students’ grades, but substantially smaller in magnitude (reductions of 0.011 to 0.017 in GPA per hour of work) than 
those found by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2003).  
4 Author’s calculations using October CPS data on 18 to 22 year olds. 
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to their studies. For example, two particularly careful non-experimental analyses by Ruhm 
(1997) and Light (1999) conclude that high school employment improves future labor market 
outcomes in the decade after high school graduation, despite possibly negative effects on 
academic achievement. Moreover, the relevance of credit constraints remains a matter of debate 
among economists, with several studies arguing that such constraints are nonexistent or 
quantitatively unimportant (see, e.g., Cameron and Taber, 2004, and Carneiro and Heckman, 
2002, respectively), while other work has found evidence of tightening constraints in recent 
years (Belley and Lochner, 2007).  
Indeed, even in the absence of borrowing constraints, students may rationally combine 
school and work if the additional hours spent studying within a given time period produce 
diminishing marginal amounts of human capital (Ben-Porath, 1967). Students will then balance 
the benefits of working against the costs to their academic performance and progress, and thus 
many factors other than credit constraints may help explain the changes over time, including 
changes in demographic composition, wages, or returns to work experience. These and other 
alternative explanations must be considered; the rise in student employment cannot be taken as 
prima facie evidence of tightening credit constraints. 
In Section II, I outline the trends in student employment using data from the October 
Current Population Survey (CPS). I show the increase over time cannot be explained away by 
any simple shifts in student demographics. In Section III, I describe a stylized model of human 
capital investment and analyze its key predictions regarding student employment. In Section IV, 
I draw upon a broad array of empirical evidence to weigh the relative importance of alternative 
explanations for the changes over time.  
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I find that no single factor can explain the overall trend, and different factors appear to 
dominate in different time periods. For example, approximately one-quarter of the increase 
between 1970 and 2000 occurred before 1982, a time when neither compositional changes, 
economic fluctuations, nor tuition increases appear to be plausible contributing factors. Instead, 
this early increase may be explained by the significant expansion of the Federal Work-Study 
program, as well as declining returns to college during that decade. Compositional changes and 
economic improvements can explain most of the increase between 1982 and 1994, and the recent 
recession can explain most (but not all) of the decline in student employment since 2005. 
Tightening credit constraints, however, are plausibly the driving explanation for higher-than-
predicted levels of student employment between 1994 and 2005, and the subsequent relaxation of 
these constraints appears to have contributed to the faster-than-predicted decline in recent years.  
II. TRENDS IN UNDERGRADUATE LABOR SUPPLY, 1970-2009 
 It is well-established that college enrollment has risen dramatically over the past several 
decades: the percentage of 18- to 22-year-old high school graduates who are enrolled in either a 
two-year or four-year college rose from around 38 percent in the early 1970s, to an all-time high 
of 58 percent in 2009. Enrollment has risen in both two-year and four-year institutions, and both 
part-time and full-time enrollments are increasing. Contrary to popular impression, two-year 
students have comprised a fairly stable share of these young college enrollees over the past 40 
years (30 percent), as have part-time students (10 percent).  
Over the same time period (until 2009), October employment for these young high school 
graduates remained surprisingly stable at about 63 percent.5 Average weekly hours of work 
(including zeros for those not working) hovered around 19-20 hours per week, with a barely 
                                                 
5 Unless otherwise noted, the “employment rate” here refers to the employment-to-population ratio. Labor force 
status is not a particularly useful concept for college students, since those enrolled in school will generally be in the 
labor force if they work and not in the labor force if they do not work. 
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perceptible decline over time. (In 2009, employment rates fell to 51 percent and average hours 
fell to 14 hours per week.) 
Since employment has remained stable while college enrollment has increased, it follows 
that more young people today are combining school and work. Figure 1 illustrates this trend by 
categorizing individuals by their activities: college only, college and work, work only, or neither. 
The expanding or contracting band widths over time show the shifts in distribution across 
categories. The figure shows that the fraction of 18 to 22 year old high school graduates 
combining school and work nearly doubled, rising from 15 percent in 1970 to a peak of 29 
percent in 2005, before falling to 25 percent in 2009.  
Turner (2005) has shown that college students are taking longer to finish their degrees; 
however, it is not the case that 18- to 22-year-olds are working more but 23- to 27–year-olds are 
working less. I demonstrate this by comparing three simulated cohorts: high school graduates 
who were aged 18 in 1970-1974, 1980-1984 or 1995-1999. Using repeated cross-sectional data 
from the CPS, I link the data from those who were 18 in 1970 with data from those who were 19 
in 1971, 20 in 1972, and so on. The results (available on request) indicate that while those in the 
recent cohorts are more likely to be enrolled in school at every age, at no age has labor force 
participation notably decreased. Although the phenomenon is most pronounced for 18- to 22-
year-olds, young high school graduates are combining work and school in substantial numbers 
throughout early adulthood. 
When the sample is limited to 18- to 22-year-old college students enrolled full-time, the 
trend emerges clearly.6 The top panel of Figure 2 shows employment rates, while the bottom 
panel shows average weekly hours. Employment rates during the survey week rose steadily from 
                                                 
6 For the remainder of the paper, all references to “college students” will refer to 18- to 22-year-old full-time college 
enrollees at either two-year or four-year institutions, unless otherwise noted.  
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33 percent in 1970 to 52 percent in 2000.7 The trend reverses after 2005, with employment 
falling from 48 to 40 percent in just five years. Similarly, average hours rose steadily from 6 
hours per week in 1970 to a peak of 11 hours per week in 2000, before leveling off to about 10 
hours per week for the past decade and then dropping to 8 hours per week in the last year of the 
series.  
Not only are more students working, but employed students work more hours than in the 
past. Average hours among workers increased from about 18 to 22 hours per week between 1970 
and 2008 before dipping to 21 weekly hours in 2009. The percentage of students working more 
than 20 hours per week nearly doubled from 10 percent to 19 percent over this same time period 
before falling to 13 percent in 2009. Finally, the percentage of students working full time rose 
from 4 percent in 1970 to 7 percent in 2008, before falling back to 4.5 percent in 2009. 
Interestingly, the long-term trend among college enrollees does not mirror that of high 
school students. From 1970 to 2000, October employment rates among 16- to 18-year-old high 
school students averaged 34 percent (and total labor supply averaged about 5 hours per week, 
including zeros), with no clear upward or downward trend. After 2000 labor supply fell sharply 
to a low of 16 percent employed and an average of just over 2 hours per week (including zeros) 
in 2009. 
How much of the trend in students’ labor supply can be explained by purely 
compositional changes (that is, changes in who attends college)? How much is explained by 
economic conditions? And how much can be attributed to rising tuition costs in combination 
with credit constraints? The following section presents a simple theoretical model to help frame 
the empirical evidence.  
                                                 
7 Employment and hours data are taken from the October CPS question, “How many hours did you work last 
week?” Surveys that ask more generally about typical weekly hours or jobs held “during the school year” tend to 
elicit substantially higher estimates.  
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III. STUDENT EMPLOYMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT THEORY 
Under the simplest model of human capital investment, versions of which were 
formulated by Becker (1962) and Rosen (1976) and later utilized and adapted by many authors, it 
is not optimal to interlace periods of schooling with periods of work. Doing so necessarily 
postpones the moment at which the individual will complete her education, and thus reduces the 
number of years she can spend in the labor force reaping the returns on her investment. Only in 
the presence of credit constraints may it be optimal to combine work and school. 
I will return to the topic of credit constraints. However, a minor modification of the 
standard model can justify a life-cycle phase combining school and work even in the absence of 
credit constraints. While the simplest model assumes that human capital can be obtained at 
constant marginal cost, the time students devote to schoolwork likely produces diminishing 
marginal amounts of human capital within any given period. As Yoram Ben-Porath (1967) writes 
in introducing his model of human capital investment, 
 It is hard to think of forms of human capital that the individual can acquire as final 
goods—he has to participate in the creation of his human capital. His own abilities, innate 
or acquired, the quality of co-operating inputs, the constraints and opportunities offered 
by the institutional setup—all determine the “technology” or the production function (p. 
352). 
  
As long as the human capital production function is concave, students will balance the marginal 
benefits of working against the marginal costs to their academic performance and progress. 
Focusing on school alone thus will not be optimal for all students in all situations.  
The basic intuition underlying the concavity of human capital production is that students’ 
time becomes less productive as more and more of it is devoted to schoolwork. This seems a 
plausible assumption. This concavity could be interpreted as an additional dimension of student 
ability, including mental focus and stamina, developmental maturity, organizational ability, or 
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study skills. It need not be fixed by nature, though; it also may result from institutional factors 
regarding course offerings and logistics. For example, as students add more courses they may 
find they are more restricted in their choices of instructors and course times. At some point, 
course availability may be restricted such that marginal costs effectively become infinite—the 
student may not be able to enroll in any additional courses that would count towards the degree.  
In equilibrium, the marginal benefits the student gains from an additional hour of 
working while in school should just equal the marginal costs, in terms of foregone (or delayed) 
human capital. If working students take longer to graduate, or graduate with fewer credits or 
lower grades, this does not necessarily indicate a market failure or irrationality on the part of 
working students. But the higher the estimated marginal costs, the higher the marginal benefits 
ought to be.  
A simple time allocation model captures the essence of this tradeoff. Consider a two-
period model in which individuals divide non-leisure time T between schooling (s) and work (h) 
in the first period. Everyone works full-time in the second period. Individuals can freely borrow, 
so the goal is to choose s and h in the first period to maximize lifetime income. Base wages w 
vary by individual ability, a. In the first period, wages are simply ))(( 1awh where ε1 captures 
periodic random variation in economic conditions. In the second period, wages are 
2),;(),);(()(  aqhgraqhsfraw
hhss where rs and rh are the per-unit wage gains from 
observable school-based and work-based human capital, respectively, and ε2 again captures 
temporary economic fluctuations (with expectation zero). I assume that both f( ) and g( ) are 
increasing and concave in s or h, respectively, and both functions also depend on the quality of 
human capital obtained, qs and qh (with low quality units requiring less time to produce) and 
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individual ability a (with low ability students requiring more time to produce the same number of 
units). The objective function is thus: 




where s(h)=T-h and β is a measure of total hours worked in the second period (it could also be 
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Intuitively, the left side of this equation represents the lifetime earnings benefit to an additional 
hour of work in the first period, while the right side represents the lifetime earnings benefit to an 
additional hour of schooling. Both school and work generate human capital that can be converted 
to additional earnings in the second period, while work also provides wages in the first period. At 
the margin, the lifetime earnings benefit of an additional hour of school or work should be equal. 
Note, if neither g( ) nor f( ) were concave, the result would be a corner solution in which 
individuals would devote all of their non-leisure time to either school or work. 
For simplicity, I assume that leisure time is fixed and that the individual is only making 
tradeoffs between school and work. If leisure were incorporated, individuals would ensure that 
an additional hour of school or work “purchases” the same amount of utility as an additional 
hour of leisure. Key predictions are summarized below; details are provided in Appendix A.  
A. Student wages  
As in any model of labor supply, wages matter. When base wages rise or there is a 
positive economic shock, students will shift towards working more. In either case, the shift is 
smaller when β is large and/or when returns to human capital are high (in other words, when 
first-period wages are a relatively small piece of lifetime earnings).  
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B. Returns to work experience  
In addition to wages (or in some cases, in place of wages), students may acquire valuable 
work experience through student employment. Even in relatively low-skilled jobs, students may 
develop soft skills, build career networks, secure references, and/or acquire information that 
enables better job matches later in life. Students shift towards work in the first period when 
returns to work experience rise, all else equal.  
The value of work experience may vary by subject. For example, those majoring in 
business may get more out of student employment than those majoring in English, particularly 
given the types of jobs available to young, part-time workers. Sales experience in a retail outlet 
may be directly relevant to a future businesswoman, but only marginally relevant to a future 
English teacher. Though not formally incorporated into the above model, work experience could 
be particularly valuable in the context of uncertainty about individual returns: acquiring some 
amount both of formal and informal human capital may be a form of “portfolio diversification” 
that increases lifetime utility by decreasing risk even if it does not increase expected lifetime 
earnings.  
C. Returns to schooling 
On the other side of the equation, students have less incentive to work when the returns to 
schooling are high. The time spent working must come from somewhere, and a student who 
either takes a bit longer to finish her degree or graduates with a lower-quality education will pay 
a higher price in terms of future earnings when the returns to schooling are high.  
D. Student ability 
Intuitively, the relationship between ability and student work decisions is ambiguous. 
High ability students may have a comparative advantage in producing school-based human 
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capital, and thus they have more to lose by increasing work hours at the cost of valuable school-
time. On the other hand, if high-ability students also command higher wages, this will increase 
their incentives to work.  
E. Credit constraints 
The factors above will influence student employment decisions even in the absence of 
credit constraints, as long as the educational production function is concave. But incorporating 
these other factors does not negate the potential for credit constraints (see Belley and Lochner 
[2011a] for a detailed treatment of human capital investment under borrowing constraints). An 
individual is credit constrained if she is unable to finance the full costs of attendance, including 
both direct costs and opportunity costs (foregone earnings), as well as any additional spending 
that may result from a desire to smooth consumption over the lifetime. While extremely 
constrained individuals may ultimately opt out of schooling, an alternative response for 
moderately constrained students is to work while enrolled, using current earnings to pay for both 
direct costs and current consumption (indeed, simulations by Keane and Wolpin [2001] suggest 
that student employment is the primary margin of response to borrowing constraints). 
While credit constraints may be most consequential for students from low-income or low-
wealth families, it is important to recognize that credit constraints may be an issue for middle-
class or even wealthier students as well. As Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011a) note, a student 
who can borrow enough to pay for tuition and fees is not necessarily unconstrained. If students 
cannot borrow enough to optimally smooth their consumption, this represents a credit constraint 
that may affect behavior, even if students can borrow enough to finance tuition and whatever 
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their parents or society might consider to be the other nondiscretionary costs of attendance.8 
Further, even if students had unlimited access to credit, they may choose to limit their own 
borrowing because of either risk aversion (if there is uncertainty around future economic 
outcomes) and/or debt aversion (if students incur negative psychic costs to holding debt). These 
internal borrowing constraints may similarly affect behavior but may be less correlated with 
family income/wealth than external constraints. 
To clarify the types of credit constraints that may affect student employment, it is useful 
to categorize them along two dimensions: whether such constraints are “strict” (preventing 
students from financing direct costs and nondiscretionary living expenses) or “fuzzy” 
(preventing students from financing additional consumption), and whether they are internally or 
externally imposed. The resulting possible types of constraints are summarized in Table 1.9  
Students facing strict constraints have two options: work more, or forego schooling 
altogether. Individuals who face fuzzy constraints have the additional option of reducing in-
school consumption—it is not necessary either to work more or to forego schooling. Both types 
of constraints are real: both will distort behavior. Either may cause students to work more and 
spend less time on schoolwork, thus delaying or diluting their educational progress; either may 
cause some to skip college altogether. But in the case of fuzzy constraints, students have more 
than one means of adjustment: they could decrease their discretionary consumption rather than 
(or at least in addition to) reallocating some of their school-time to paid employment (this is 
consistent with the standard implication that when individuals face constraints, educational 
                                                 
8 Assuming that the educational investment is a good one, lifetime income will be higher if an individual chooses to 
enroll. Thus, in the absence of credit constraints there is no reason for an individual to choose a lower level of 
consumption as a student than as a non-student.  
9 Of course, these are not the only dimensions along which constraints can vary. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 
(2011b) focus on exogenous constraints versus endogenous constraints, where access to credit is tied to the direct 
costs of educational investment. 
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investments will be more sensitive to changes in direct costs than opportunity costs; see Lochner 
and Monge-Naranjo [2011a]). The economically optimal solution will depend on each student’s 
intertemporal consumption preferences, i.e. the extent to which the student is willing to trade 
consumption now for consumption later.  
Internally-imposed constraints, whether a result of risk aversion or pure debt aversion, 
can have similar consequences. Even when students are able to borrow to finance their 
educational investment, they may not want to. Even if trading school for work is expected to be a 
good investment on average, it may not pay off for everyone, at least within the time frame of 
loan repayment requirements. Alternatively, internal constraints may result from a purely 
psychological disutility associated with being in debt or from a semi-rational rule-of-thumb that 
leads students to avoid financial transactions they don’t fully understand. In comparison with 
externally imposed constraints, internal constraints may be less correlated with family 
income/wealth, and may have very different policy implications. 
F. Other possible explanations 
To the extent a college degree is purely a signal and true effort/quality are difficult for 
employers to observe, students may have incentives to “free-ride” off the hard work of their 
predecessors, completing their degrees with the least effort required (see, e.g. Babcock and 
Marks 2011). One might hypothesize that when school quality is low (in this framework, 
meaning that coursework is not very demanding) students will have more time to spend working. 
But the opposite conclusion is relatively easy to reach: when qs is low, the time-cost of obtaining 
human capital is low, so there is an incentive to purchase more human capital. Rather than 
freeing up more time for work, low-quality schooling may create incentives for students to 
pursue higher grades, “stock up” on additional courses or degrees (for example, adding double or 
   
 16
even triple-majors), or simply to finish degrees faster, if their school allows. The effect of school 
quality or course difficulty on student employment is thus ambiguous, and will depend both on 
students’ ability to adjust their course loads as well as on employers’ ability to observe school 
quality.  
Institutional context may affect student employment via at least two pathways. First, the 
educational production function is not necessarily fixed by nature, but may vary depending on 
institutional context. Institutional crowding may cause the production function to become flat 
after a point, if students are not able to get into all of the courses they want in a given term. 
Second, the structure of tuition and fee charges may affect student employment. The model 
above assumes that tuition is fixed (per term), so that it does not affect the marginal tradeoff 
between school and work. But if tuition is charged per-course, this will strengthen the incentives 
to work even in the absence of credit constraints. In the case of per-term charges, when tuition 
rises students may have an incentive to work less, if doing so makes it possible to complete 
schooling in fewer terms.  
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
 Credit constraints, in combination with rising real tuition costs, provide one popular 
hypothesis for the change over time. But with so many students working, and with so many 
factors potentially affecting students’ employment decisions, it is important to consider the role 
of alternative explanations for the trend. In this section I evaluate the evidence for these 
alternative explanations, based on the factors described above in Section III.  
A. Compositional changes 
Many of the factors listed in Section III will vary depending on the individual. As college 
enrollments have expanded, it is possible that the composition of the student population has 
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shifted. Perhaps some individuals who in a previous era would have only worked, either because 
of low returns to schooling, high returns to work experience, or socioeconomic barriers to access, 
are now shifting into college. These marginal individuals may retain their higher propensity to 
work even as they enroll in school, and thus compositional change may drive an increase in 
student employment even without any deeper structural changes.  
If this were the case, controlling for the changing composition of the college student 
population would eliminate the apparent increase over time. Relevant covariates are limited in 
the CPS, but one can examine subgroups defined by race, gender, age, dependency status, 
parental income quartile, parental education, and attendance at public versus private 
institutions.10, 11 As indicated in the panels of Figure 3, while the trend is slightly stronger for 
some groups (such as students at public institutions, and 19 to 21 year olds) and slightly weaker 
for others (such as those in the top income quartile), the basic pattern is replicated for every 
subgroup I examine. It is thus clear that basic compositional changes are not going to explain 
away the trend.  
Nonetheless, there are important differences in levels of work along some dimensions 
that are shifting, most notably age and dependency status, which may explain some of the change 
over time. For example, older, independent students are more likely to work and make up an 
increasing fraction even of this “traditional” college population. In 1970, 21 and 22 year olds 
made up only 11 percent of this group, but comprised 31 percent of the sample when average 
hours peaked in 2000. Also, the percentage of the sample defined as independent increased from 
                                                 
10 I have classified anyone who is not a household head or spouse as dependent to ensure a consistent definition over 
time. This will include some individuals living with roommates rather than parents; however, the coding of the 
CPS’s “household relationship” variable changed in 1989, 1994, and 1995, making it impossible to more 
specifically identify dependent children in a consistent way over time.  
11 Parental income and education are available only for students who are still dependent on their parents (dependent 
students, even if living away at college, are to be surveyed as part of their parents’ household).  
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about 8 percent to 14 percent over this time period. To summarize the role of compositional 
change, I regress hours worked on age and dependency status, as well as gender, race/ethnicity, 
marital status, region, parental income quartile, parental education dummies, and public/private 
enrollment status (regression results are provided in Appendix B).12 Using the parameter 
estimates from this regression I predict hours worked in each year; the predicted trend indicates 
how much we would have expected labor supply to change as a result of compositional changes 
alone.13  
The predicted and actual values are plotted in Figure 4. This shows that compositional 
changes (primarily by age and dependency status) alone would have predicted an increase of 
about 1.3 hours between 1970 and 2009, or about 65 percent of the actual increase. Looking at 
the full 1970-2009 trend is misleading, however, because it combines severe under-predictions of 
both the 1970-2000 increase as well as the subsequent decrease in hours. When I separate these 
two time periods, I find that predicted hours can explain only about 20 percent of the 1970-2000 
increase, and actually predict a slight increase between 2000 and 2009 when hours fell 
substantially. I conclude that while compositional changes can explain a fraction of the increase 
up through 2000, they are not the driving factor during that period nor do they explain any of the 
reversal in trend since then. 
Of course, there is still room for substantial compositional shifts even within these broad 
demographic groups. Even among white, male, middle-income nineteen year olds attending 
private universities, the marginal student may have a higher propensity to work. But the evidence 
                                                 
12 Parental income and education dummies are set to zero for independent students, and the dependency dummy 
serves as the missing data indicator in these regressions. Income quartile cutoffs are established using families 
including at least one member between age 16 and 30, regardless of college enrollment status. 
13 I utilize ordinary least squares (OLS) regression; however, a Tobit specification to account for the left-censoring 
of hours at zero returns virtually identical results.   
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above suggests that the trends in student labor supply are remarkably broad-based and thus 
cannot be explained away by any simple shifts in student demographics.  
B. Economic conditions 
The recent recession makes obvious the need to incorporate economic conditions into any 
model of trends in students’ labor supply. As the wages students can command rise and fall, this 
will change the tradeoff between time spent on schoolwork versus paid employment. Although 
the October CPS does collect wage data, they do so only for a relatively small subsample and 
only since 1981. For these reasons I choose instead to use unemployment rates (by state and 
year) as a proxy for broader economic conditions. Unemployment rates follow a similar (inverse) 
pattern as wages, are less noisy and enable me to utilize the entire 40-year data series.  
Economic conditions clearly will do little to explain the increases in both employment 
and hours between 1970 and 1982, a period of generally rising unemployment. But the long-term 
decline in unemployment rates between 1982 and 2000, and the subsequent fluctuations, are 
broadly consistent with trends in student labor supply. To quantify the role of economic 
conditions, I add state-year unemployment rates to the model above that predicts average weekly 
hours as a function of demographic characteristics, and generate a new series of predicted hours. 
The resulting predictions are plotted in Figure 5, with actual hours plotted for comparison.  
With two periods of notable exception, the predicted hours now generally track actual 
hours. Overall, this model—including both demographic characteristics and economic 
conditions—can explain about 29 percent of the increase in hours between 1970 and 2000, and 
70 percent of the decrease since then. But between 1970 and 1982, labor supply rose by 1.1 
hours per week although a decline of 1.4 hours was predicted; between 1993 and 2005, actual 
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labor supply rose faster and then remained persistently about three-quarters of an hour higher 
than predicted. 
C. Rising real tuition costs in combination with credit constraints 
College costs have risen dramatically over the past 40 years, even after accounting for 
inflation. As shown in Figure 6, average published tuition and fee charges have risen 
substantially at all institution types since 1980. At public four-year institutions, which enroll the 
majority of 18- to 22-year-old students, inflation-adjusted costs more than tripled, from $2,097 in 
1980 to $7,396 in 2009 (measured in constant 2011 dollars). Tuition and fees have also more 
than doubled at both two-year and private four-year institutions.  
Rising tuition costs, however, do not appear to be a good explanation for the rapid 
increase in student employment between 1970 and 1982, because tuition prices were stable in 
real terms during that time. Moreover, both Pell Grants and federal Stafford Loan limits were at 
historical highs relative to tuition prices during that period (see Figure 7). For example, in 1977-
78 the average Pell Grant (among recipients, in 1977 dollars) was $748, which would more than 
cover the average tuition of $655 at a public four-year institution; the Stafford Loan limit for a 
first-year student was $2,500, which would nearly cover the $2,700 tuition and fees at a private 
four-year institution (College Board, 2011b).14 
Credit constraints are a much more plausible explanation for the faster-than-predicted 
increase and then persistently higher-than-predicted average hours of work during the 1993-2005 
period. While prices continued to rise, sources of financial aid failed to keep up. As shown in 
Figure 6, 1994 was the first year in which the Stafford Loan limit (then $2,625) would fail to 
                                                 
14 For historical information on Pell Grant average awards, see “FinAid: FinAid for Educators and FAAs: Pell Grant 
Historical Figures.” FinAid: The Smart Student Guide to Financial Aid, 
http://www.finaid.org/educators/pellgrant.phtml. For historical information on Stafford Loan Limits, see “FinAid: 
Loans: Historical Loan Limits.” FinAid: The Smart Student Guide to Financial Aid, 
http://www.finaid.org/loans/historicallimits.phtml. 
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cover average tuition and fees at a public four-year institution (then $2,705); the loan-limit-to-
tuition ratio continued to fall steadily through 2005. Similarly, the average Pell Grant had fallen 
to cover just 56 percent of the average public four-year tuition by 1994, and fell even further to 
cover just 45 percent by 2005.  
A relaxation of credit constraints can also potentially explain why labor supply has fallen 
faster than predicted since 2005 (recall that economic fluctuations only explained about 70 
percent of the decline since 2000—most of which took place since 2005). While published prices 
have continued their steady upward climb, Figure 6 shows that net prices in all sectors were 
actually lower in 2009-10 than they were in 2005-06. These net prices are calculated by 
subtracting out estimated grant aid (from all sources) and the estimated value of education-
related income tax credits and deductions, by sector (College Board, 2011a). The net price of a 
private four-year in 2009 was 2 percent lower than the net price in 2005, and the net price for a 
public four-year was 13 percent lower. The net price of a public two-year institution went from 
negative $60 to negative $810 over this time period, meaning the average student received more 
in grant aid than he or she was charged in tuition and fees.  
Evidence of tightening constraints between the late 1970s and the late 1990s comes from 
other sources as well. Using data from the NLSY-79, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) compare 
college enrollment and completion across income groups, controlling for ability and 
demographic characteristics. Under the assumption that families in the top quartile are 
unconstrained, they calculate that the adjusted differences in outcomes by income imply that no 
more than 8 percent of the U.S. population was credit constrained in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. Belley and Lochner (2007) update and extend this analysis using data from the NLSY-97. 
While they do not provide a specific estimated percentage constrained, they find that college 
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attendance gaps by income (controlling for ability) increased substantially for the NLSY-97 
cohorts. They conclude that this pattern cannot be explained except by credit constraints. Belley 
and Lochner also examine patterns of student employment, and find that while hours worked 
were unrelated to family income in the NLSY-79 cohorts, they were strongly related in the 
NLSY-97 cohorts for high-ability students: among the top quartile of ability, low-income 
students worked about twice as much as high-income students.  
One remaining puzzle for the borrowing constraints explanation, however, is that while 
trends in average hours are slightly less pronounced for the top quartile of family income, they 
have followed similar patterns for all income groups (see panel D of Figure 3). For example, 
among students in the top quartile of family income labor supply as measured in the CPS still 
rose by more than 80 percent between 1970 and 2000, from 5 to over 9 hours per week, before 
falling to 6.6 hours in 2009. Belley and Lochner (2007) also concede that they find large income 
effects on college enrollment even for the top half of the income distribution, evidence which 
they find “difficult to reconcile” with borrowing constraints (p. 80). 
 One way to measure credit constraints directly is simply to ask students, “Could you 
afford college without working?” A student who responds “No” to this question is almost by 
definition credit constrained. In this case perception equals reality: it matters little for behavior 
(though immensely for policy) whether the student actually has no access to credit, or simply 
perceives she does not. Table 2 presents employment statistics, along with responses to this 
question for 18 to 22-year-old full-time four-year working students in the 2003-04 NPSAS. The 
statistics are broken out by income quartiles, where quartiles are defined over this sample of 
dependent, full-time four-year enrollees. 
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The pattern of responses raises several points. First, about half of working students say 
they could not afford school without working. This suggests that credit constraints are a 
significant factor in students’ employment choices, even if they are not the only factor. Second, 
responses clearly correlate with family income, but the biggest gap on this “affordability” 
question is between the top two income quartiles: working students in the upper-middle quartile 
are 16 percentage points more likely to say they could not afford school without working than 
those in the top quartile. (Unfortunately, the “affordability” question was not asked in early 
iterations of the NPSAS.) The difference between the middle two quartiles is 9 percentage 
points, and between the bottom two quartiles, less than 3 percentage points. Third, even among 
working students in the top quartile (with a median family income of $143,000), nearly one in 
three responded that college would be unaffordable without a job.  
This suggests that credit constraints may be a significant factor in student employment 
decisions even among the relatively well-off—a possibility that is rarely discussed, but becomes 
plausible when one considers a broad definition of credit constraints as described in Section III, 
rather than focusing purely on strict, externally-imposed constraints.  Wealthy students, for 
example, tend to attend significantly pricier schools (College Board, 2006) and are more likely to 
have siblings enrolled at the same time (author’s calculations using NPSAS:04). Moreover, they 
may have a greater desire to consumption-smooth if they have a greater expectation of high 
earnings after graduation.  
 Table 2 sheds light on the types of constraints facing different families. Working students 
from the bottom quartile are almost twice as likely as those in the top quartile to say that their 
primary reason for working is to pay tuition and fees (62 percent versus 35 percent), and half as 
likely to say they work primarily to pay “living expenses” (27 percent versus 50 percent). This 
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supports the hypothesis that low-income families are more likely to face strict constraints while 
the rich are more likely to face fuzzy constraints. Finally, the third panel of Table 2 indicates that 
both external and internal constraints may be important for those who report they couldn’t afford 
school without working. About half of these students took out the maximum student loan, an 
indicator that they may face binding external credit constraints. On the other hand, half did not, 
suggesting an internally-imposed constraint. Interestingly, among those eligible for a subsidized 
student loan, poor students were slightly more likely than eligible rich students to decline these 
loans.  
D. Other possible explanations 
1. The Federal Work-Study Program 
About one-quarter of the increase in hours between 1970 and 2000 occurred in the 1970s, 
when neither compositional changes, economic conditions, nor borrowing constraints appear to 
play much role. One possible explanation for the increase in this early period is the expansion of 
the Federal Work-Study (FWS) program. The program was inaugurated in 1964, and the number 
of students receiving assistance from it rose from 425,000 in 1970 to over 900,000 in 1979 
before falling and then leveling off around 700,000. The ratio of FWS recipients to the 18- to 22-
year-old full-time enrolled student population rose from 12 percent in 1970 to 18 percent in 
1979, and has fallen steadily since to less than 9 percent in 2007.15 At the prevailing average of 
18 hours of work per week among workers during this period, this would account for up to a 1.1 
hour increase in overall labor supply (18*0.06=1.1). 
Referring back to Figure 2, note that the student employment rate rose from 34 to 38 
percentage points during the 1970s and average hours rose by 1.1. Thus, the expansion in FWS 
                                                 
15 Students over age 22 are also eligible for FWS assistance; accounting for changes in the age distribution of 
college enrollees would only accentuate the pattern here (i.e. including older students in the denominator would 
lower the ratio disproportionately in more recent years). 
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participation is large enough to account for all of the actual increase in employment.16 Moreover, 
while employment was increasing during this period, hours among those who worked remained 
steady and there was no increase in the proportion of students working more than 20 hours per 
week. This is also consistent with the FWS explanation, since students in the program are 
generally limited to 10 to 15 hours of work per week. 
2. Returns to work experience 
Previous literature (Ruhm 1997, Light 1998) suggests that students’ in-school work 
experience may have labor market payoffs after graduation. Is it possible that increases in the 
return to work experience can explain the particularly rapid growth in student employment 
during either the 1970s or the period from 1994-2005? 
At least in recent years, work experience does not appear to be a primary motivation for 
student employment: only 8 percent of working students surveyed in the 2003-2004 NPSAS 
reported work experience as their “main reason” for working. That it plays such a small role in a 
recent cross section makes it a less plausible candidate for the large increases over time. 
Unfortunately, similar survey data are unavailable for the 1970s. But if work experience were an 
increasingly important factor, we might expect to see students shifting towards higher-skilled 
jobs. Figure 8 thus presents trends in broad occupational categories among working students in 
the CPS. Though data are available for the entire series, major revisions to the occupational 
classification scheme occurred in 1983 and 2003, so the large shifts in those years likely result 
from definitional rather than real changes.  
The patterns revealed in Figure 8 confirm that changes in the returns to working are an 
unlikely explanation for the increase in student employment between 1982 and 2000; however, it 
                                                 
16 Recall, however, that because the 1970s were also a period of rising unemployment, we might actually have 
expected a decline in hours during this time. 
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may have played some role both in the increase during the 1970s and the decline post-2003. For 
example, during the 1970s there was a significant shift among working students away from 
labor/farm occupations towards service positions. Interestingly, these occupational shifts 
diverged from the trends among non-enrolled young workers at the time, for whom the 
likelihood of working in labor/farm occupations continued to increase through 1978. This 
occupational shift would, however, be consistent with the expansion of Federal Work-Study. 
Since 2003, student employment has shifted towards lower-skill jobs: working students are 
increasingly in service occupations rather than professional, technical, managerial, or clerical 
positions. The decreased availability of high-return jobs may help explain the decline in hours in 
recent years (which has been more rapid than simply the broad unemployment rate would 
predict).  
3. Returns to schooling and the possibility of declining educational quality 
The lower the labor market returns to schooling, the higher the incentive to work while 
enrolled. This provides an additional possible explanation for the increase in labor supply during 
the 1970s, since the college wage premium was declining during this decade. It is clearly not a 
good candidate explanation for more recent trends, since the college wage premium has risen 
steadily and substantially since 1980 (see Goldin and Katz, 2008).  
There is less evidence about trends in educational quality, mainly because educational 
quality is so difficult to measure. And as described in Section III, it is not theoretically clear that 
declining educational quality should lead students to shift time from school to work, but it is 
certainly possible (particularly if students are approaching a flat part of the educational 
production function). Recent research by Babcock and Marks (2011) does provide suggestive 
evidence that the “time-cost” of college is falling: using multiple sources of survey data, the 
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authors find that full-time college attendance required 40 per week in 1961 but only 23 to 26 
hours per week in 2004. Babcock and Marks have only fairly granular measures of student labor 
supply. They find that the decline in study time corresponds with an increase in work, but also 
that study time has decreased even among non-workers. One explanation they offer for the 
decline in study time is that today’s students may be “free-riding” off of the hard work of 
previous generations of students who established the high returns to a college degree. 
There are two problems with this as an explanation for the trend in student employment. 
First, relying only on time use data leaves the direction of causality unclear. Students might work 
more because they are spending less time on school, or they might be working more for some 
other reason, and spending less time on school as a consequence. Second, if a college degree 
requires less effort than in the past, this does not square with the trend that students are taking 
longer to finish their degrees (Turner, 2005).  
4. Institutional crowding 
If institutional capacity has not kept up with rising enrollments, students may not be able 
to take all of the courses they need in a given semester, and this would increase the incentive to 
work. Bound and Turner (2006), comparing outcomes between birth cohorts of varying sizes, 
find suggestive evidence that those in large birth cohorts within states take longer to finish their 
degrees, which they hypothesize may be due to institutional crowding. It follows that students 
whose degree progression is slowed would have more time to work while in school. Bound, 
Lovenheim, and Turner (2010) also find that while resources per student have increased for 
private and the most selective public institutions, they have stagnated or declined over time for 
the remaining institutions.  
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The increase in labor supply is certainly stronger for students at public four year 
institutions. Between 1970 and 2005, labor supply rose from 5.1 to 10.1 hours per week among 
full-time students at four-year public institutions, a 98 percent increase. It rose from 3.6 to 8.1 
hours per week for equivalent private-college enrollees, an 80 percent increase.  If institutional 
crowding plays no role at these private institutions, but explains all of the difference in labor 
supply trends between public and private enrollees, then institutional crowding could explain up 
to 25 percent of the overall increase in labor supply during this time.17 This is a generous upper 
bound; the true effect will be smaller if other factors such as credit constraints also apply 
disproportionately to public enrollees (recall that prices have risen fastest in percentage terms at 
public four-year schools). 
V. DISCUSSION 
This paper has documented and attempted to explain the large increase in student 
employment between 1970 and 2000, followed by a stagnation through 2005 and recent sharp 
decline. My analysis suggests that no single factor is responsible for the observed pattern, and 
the importance of different factors itself has shifted over time.   
Table 3 summarizes the plausibility of alternative explanations during different time 
periods. Between 1970 and 1982, compositional change plays a modest role – explaining about 
half of the observed increase (or about 20 percent of the “residual” increase after accounting for 
economic conditions).18 Neither economic conditions nor trends in college costs can explain any 
of the increase during this early period. Instead, the expansion of the Federal Work-Study 
program appears to be a significant factor. Increases in the return to work experience, declines in 
                                                 
17 This calculation assumes that institutional crowding explains the full difference-in-difference of hours worked 
between public and private enrollees (1.4 hours), weights this by the fraction of enrollees that are at public 
institutions in 2005 (78 percent) and divides by the total increase of 4.4 hours (1.4*0.78/4.4=25 percent). 
18 The “residual increase” is larger than the observed increase because economic conditions suggest that hours 
should have been declining during this period, all else equal. 
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the return to schooling, and institutional crowding may also have contributed to the increase over 
the 1970s. 
Between 1982 and 1993, compositional change and economic fluctuations can more than 
explain the observed increase (explaining 19 percent and 94 percent, respectively). Rising tuition 
and potential institutional crowding are also consistent with, but not necessary to explain the 
trend during this period. 
Since 1993, however, credit constraints appear to play more of a role. Compositional 
change and economic fluctuations (primarily the latter) together can explain only about 40 
percent of the increase between 1993 and 2005, and only about 60 percent of the decline since 
2005. Between 1993 and 2005 tuition continued to rise sharply in real terms while the value of 
student aid declined. Since 2005, however, net tuition has actually fallen in real terms after 
accounting for significant increases in student aid. 
In 2009, for the first time ever, 18 to 22 year old high school graduates were more likely 
to be going to college and not working than they were to be working and not going to college. 
Employment rates and hours of work among college students in 2009 were near a 30-year low.. 
Clearly, broader economic conditions are the predominant explanation for the recent reversal in 
student employment trends, and students are likely to return to work again in larger numbers 
when unemployment rates decline. However, this analysis suggests that borrowing constraints 
(whether strict or fuzzy, internally-imposed or externally-imposed) are also a significant factor 
for explaining recent trends. Thus, what happens to student employment in coming years will 
also depend on whether recent increases in student aid can continue to outpace increases in 
published prices. 
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Types of Credit Constraints 
   
  Source of constraint 
Margin of 
constraint External Internal 
Strict Student cannot borrow the minimum 
required to pay tuition and 
nondiscretionary living expenses.  Likely 
to apply mainly to students from low-
income families (or those estranged 
from their parents) 
Students can borrow the minimum 
required to pay tuition and basic 
living expenses, but choose not to 
because of either risk aversion or 
disutility of debt. May apply to 
anyone, but mainly becomes an 
issue for low-income students (or 
those estranged from their parents) 
Fuzzy Students can borrow the minimum 
required to pay tuition and 
nondiscretionary living expenses, but 
cannot borrow enough to optimally 
smooth consumption. Worse for lower-
income students, but may apply across 
the income scale (particularly if parents’ 
generosity is bounded). 
Students can borrow enough to 
fully finance schooling and smooth 
consumption, but choose not to 
because of either risk aversion or 
disutility of debt. May apply to 
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Table 2
Employment and Reasons for Work, By Family Income
Bottom Top
Variable All Quartile Q2 Q3 Quartile
Average weekly hours of work 14.0 15.2 15.1 13.9 11.8
Employed during school year (%) 70.0 71.7 74.0 71.2 63.3
Conditional weekly hours of work 20.0 21.2 20.5 19.5 18.7
Received any federal work-study aid (%) 18.8 26.5 22.3 16.4 9.9
Median income ($) 74,530 21,200 51,669 81,119 144,168
Sample size (rounded to nearest 10) 17,050 4,430 4,210 4,120 4,290
Among working students
Main reason for employment
Pay tuition and fees (%) 49.8 61.5 55.6 47.3 34.8
Pay living expenses (%) 37.9 27.1 33.8 40.4 50.0
Work experience (%) 8.4 7.0 6.7 8.3 11.6
Cannot afford school without working (%) 47.3 58.3 54.5 45.6 30.1
Median income ($) 74,003 21,634 51,703 80,982 142,631
Sample size (rounded to nearest 10) 9,170 2,310 2,380 2,340 2,140
Among students who "cannot afford school without working"
Took out maximum federal student loan 49.6 44.2 52.5 52.4 49.4
Took out loan, but less than maximum 10.4 14.3 10.0 9.3 5.5
Took out no loan 39.9 41.3 37.4 38.2 44.9
Eligible for any subsidized loan 77.0 98.2 93.7 61.8 27.3
Of these, took out less than maximum 55.0 56.6 55.1 52.3 54.4
Of these, fully declined the loan 39.4 41.4 39.7 36.4 34.3
Sample size (rounded to nearest 10) 4,210 1,310 1,260 1,030 610  
Source: Author's calculations using NPSAS:2003-04 data. 
Notes: Income quartiles are defined over this sample of full-time dependent four-year enrollees. Students 
who exclusively worked at a work-study job were not asked the questions about the main reason for 
working or whether school could be afforded without working.  Thus these students are excluded in the 
bottom two panels of the table. Students are eligible for federally-guaranteed loans regardless of need.  
Subsized loans are based on need, a combination of financial status and cost of attendance.




Explanations for Student Employment Trends, 1970-2009 
      
    Time Period 
Explanation 1970-1982 1982-1993 1993-2005 2005-2009
  
Actual change in hours 1.1 1.6 1.7 -2.4
  
Expected change due to   
 compositional change 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2
  
Expected change due to   
 economic fluctuations -2.0 1.5 0.5 -1.7
  
Residual unexplained 
trend 2.5 -0.2 1.0 -0.9
        
  
Explanations consistent with residual trend? 
 Tuition/fees net of aid no  yes  yes  yes  
  (stable)  (increasing)  (increasing)  (declining)
 Federal Work Study yes no no no
   (increasing)  (declining)  (stable)  (stable)
 Returns to work exp. yes no no yes
 
  (decline in 
labor/farm 
occupations)
 (stable)  (stable)  (decline in 
prof/mgr 
occupations)
 Returns to schooling yes no no no
   (declining)  (increasing)  (increasing)  (increasing)
 Institutional crowding yes yes yes no
   (increasing)  (increasing)  (increasing)   (increasing) 
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Figure 1
Enrollment and Employment Combinations








































College Only College & Work Work Only Neither
 
Source: Author's calculations using October Current Population Survey, 1970-2009, compiled by 
Unicon Corp.  
Notes: College refers to part- or full-time enrollment in a two- or four-year institution. 
Employment refers to part- or full-time paid employment in the past week. 
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Employed Over 20 hrs. per week Full-time
 
Source: Author's calculations using October Current Population Survey data, 1970-2009 
(compiled by Unicon Corp.) on 18- to 22-year-old full-time college enrollees. 
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Figure 3
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Source: Author's calculations using October Current Population Survey data, 1970-2009 
(compiled by Unicon Corp.) on 18- to 22-year-old full-time college enrollees.  
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Figure 4
Actual and Predicted Average Weekly Hours








































Source: Author's estimates using October Current Population Survey data, 1970-2009 (compiled 
by Unicon Corp.) on 18- to 22-year-old full-time undergraduates. 
Notes: Average hours include zeroes for non-workers.  See text for details. 
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Figure 5
Actual and Predicted Average Weekly Hours








































Source: Author's estimates using October Current Population Survey data, 1970-2009 (compiled 
by Unicon Corp.) on 18- to 22-year-old full-time undergraduates. 
Notes: Average hours include zeroes for non-workers.  See text for details. 
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Figure 6


















































































Private Four-Year Public Four-Year Public Two-Year
Private Four-Year (Net) Public Four-Year (Net) Public Two-Year (Net)
 
Source: College Board (2004, 2005, 2011b). Net tuition and fees are calculated by subtracting 
estimated average grant aid plus tax benefits per full-time student in the sector from the 
published price. Original source for data 1987-88 through 2010-11: Annual Survey of Colleges, 
The College Board. Original source for earlier data: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS), U.S. Department of Education.  
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Figure 7
Average Pell Grants and Stafford Loan Limits 



















































































Average Pell Grant (Recipients) Stafford Loan Limits (First-Years)
 
Source: Author's calculations based on tuition and fee data from the College Board (2004, 2005, 
2011b). For historical information on average Pell Grant awards and Stafford Loan maxima, see 
"FinAid: The Smart Student Guide to Financial Aid," www.finaid.org.  
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Figure 8
























































Professional, technical, managerial, clerical Service Sales Labor/farm
 
Source: Author's estimates using October Current Population Survey data, 1970-2009 (compiled 
by Unicon Corp.) on employed 18- to 22-year-old full-time undergraduates. 
Notes: Occupational classifications underwent major changes in 1983 and 2003; thus, changes in 
the observed occupational distribution during those periods is likely due to definitional rather 
than real changes.




Noting the dependence of h* on the exogenous parameters, the first-order condition can 




















Analyzing this equation will formalize largely intuitive implications regarding how h* depends 
on wages, returns to school and work, ability, school quality, and other factors—even in the 
absence of credit constraints. 
Student wages. As in any model of labor supply, wages matter. Higher base wages will 




































Since both g( ) and f( ) are concave, 
dw
h*
>0. Students shift time from school to work in the first 
period when wages rise, all else equal. The shift is smaller when β is large and/or when returns to 
human capital are high (in other words, when base wages are a relatively small piece of lifetime 
earnings).  















































>0. Students shift towards work in the first 
period when returns to work experience rise, all else equal.  
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<0. Students work less in the first period if 
returns to schooling increase.  
Student ability. Intuitively, the relationship between ability and student work decisions is 






























































The denominator is negative, but the sign of the numerator is ambiguous. To the extent that 
ability affects the marginal productivity of school-based human capital more than it affects the 
marginal productivity of work-based human capital (and to the extent that returns to schooling 
are higher than returns to work experience), this will push higher-ability students to work less. If 
high-ability students also command significantly higher base wages, however, this creates an 
incentive to work more.  
School quality.  Intuitively, one might guess that when school quality is low students will 
have more time to spend working. However, this conclusion does not clearly follow from the 
formal analysis: 





















































<0, in other words, that marginal productivity of observable 
school-based human capital is higher when school quality is lower. Intuitively, students need less 
time to produce the same number of courses completed when coursework is less demanding. 





>0 and that students work less when coursework is less demanding.  
This result, however, relies crucially on the assumption that school quality affects only 
the cost of educational investment, not the returns on that investment. In reality, returns may be 
an increasing function of school quality—employers may not be completely blind. If this is the 






























































The denominator remains negative but the numerator is now ambiguous. The first term in the 
numerator remains negative, but the second term is positive.  The less that returns depend on 






positive; that is, the more likely that low-quality schooling will induce students to work less 
rather than more. 




Predictors of Average Weekly Hours 
       
      Model 1 Model 2 
Independent variable     Coeff. (Std. Err) Coeff. (Std. Err) 
       
Female 0.39 (0.07) 0.36 (0.07) 
Black, non-hispanic -2.84 (0.12) -2.77 (0.12) 
Hispanic 0.22 (0.15) 0.23 (0.15) 
Missing race/ethnicity -0.44 (0.40) -0.35 (0.40) 
Midwest region 2.10 (0.10) 2.05 (0.10) 
South region 1.78 (0.10) 1.82 (0.10) 
West region 1.81 (0.11) 2.07 (0.11) 
Ever married 0.04 (0.21) 0.09 (0.21) 
Not household head or spouse -5.73 (0.14) -5.67 (0.14) 
Age 19 1.85 (0.10) 1.83 (0.10) 
Age 20 3.06 (0.11) 3.04 (0.11) 
Age 21 3.56 (0.11) 3.57 (0.11) 
Age 22 4.54 (0.13) 4.55 (0.13) 
Public four-year institution -4.24 (0.09) -4.30 (0.09) 
Private four-year institution -5.32 (0.11) -5.38 (0.11) 
Lowest family income quartile -1.33 (0.14) -1.33 (0.14) 
Lower middle family income quartile 0.09 (0.12) 0.08 (0.12) 
Upper middle family income quartile 0.69 (0.10) 0.72 (0.10) 
Mother: Less than HS education 0.41 (0.18) 0.57 (0.18) 
Mother: HS diploma only 1.12 (0.11) 1.24 (0.11) 
Mother: Some college, no degree 1.58 (0.11) 1.58 (0.11) 
Mother: Missing education 2.95 (0.17) 2.95 (0.16) 
Father: Less than HS education 0.99 (0.18) 1.04 (0.18) 
Father: HS diploma only 1.96 (0.12) 1.95 (0.12) 
Father: Some college, no degree 2.09 (0.11) 2.04 (0.11) 
Father: Missing education 2.36 (0.13) 2.35 (0.13) 
State-year level unemployment rate   -39.26 (1.74) 
Constant 11.57 (0.18) 13.76 (0.20) 
              
R-squared 0.074 0.078 
Sample size 113,899 113,899 
Source: Author's estimates using October Current Population Survey data, 1970-2009 (compiled by 
Unicon Corp.) on 18- to 22-year-old full-time undergraduates. 
Notes: Average hours include zeroes for non-workers. All coefficients are from ordinary least squares 
regression. Using a Tobit specification produces virtuallly identical predictions of annual average hours. 
